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Abstract 
This article starts from the observation that most voters know relatively little about 
positions and plans of political parties, especially when European Union politics is 
concerned. One reason for this could be that the main sources for political 
information, party communication and mass media coverage, provide voters only little 
concrete information about positions and plans of political parties. We ask how 
concretely, respectively vaguely, political parties and mass media communicate 
political positions prior to the 2014 European Parliament elections. We conducted a 
quantitative content analysis of all European Union–related press releases from 46 
national political parties and of all European Union–related articles of 14 national 
quality newspapers from 7 European countries 12 weeks before the 2014 European 
Parliament elections. Our analysis shows that press releases as well as media 
coverage contain more concrete political positions on European Union issues than 
vague political statements. Other than expected, newspaper coverage provided the 
public with less concrete information than political actors did. Nevertheless, countries 
vary with regard to the extent to which party communication or newspaper coverage 
contain vague statements. We cannot find empirical support that the communication 
of concrete political positions depends on a party’s “extremity” of issue position or on 
the type of issue. 
 
 
Keywords 
Political ambiguity, position blurring, equivocation, strategic political communication, 
European Parliament elections 
  
s
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
h
t
t
p
s
:
/
/
d
o
i
.
o
r
g
/
1
0
.
7
8
9
2
/
b
o
r
i
s
.
1
4
7
1
5
7
 
|
 
d
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
:
 
2
7
.
1
2
.
2
0
2
0
2 
 
Introduction 
From a normative democratic viewpoint, it would be desirable if citizens were informed 
before elections about the aims and plans of political parties so they could make rational 
election decisions (e.g., Habermas, 1981; Downs, 1957). Having political knowledge 
contributes to better political decisions and a higher quality of democratic representation. 
Providing politically relevant information “is regarded as one of the core functions of political 
parties as they should help citizens in evaluating the complex and remote world of politics” 
(Popa et al., 2020). 
Nevertheless, most European voters have relatively little knowledge about the plans 
and positions of political parties – especially regarding EU politics and policies (Hurrelmann 
et al., 2015; Maier, 2009; Popa et al., 2020; Westle, 2013) – and they do not always build 
their voting decisions rationally (e.g., Downs, 1957; Kepplinger and Maurer, 2005). The 
reason for this could, on one hand, lie with the voters themselves: they might use political 
information only sparsely or selectively, process it incompletely, and forget the information 
received (e.g., Downs, 1957; Lodge et al., 1995; Kepplinger and Daschmann, 1997). On the 
other hand, it could be due to the sources of political information that citizens use: they could 
contain little information relevant to an election (i.e., the “quantity” of information) or little 
concrete information (i.e., the “quality” of information; e.g., Maurer, 2009; Maier, 2009). 
Citizens have largely two main sources of political information. The first is party 
communication (such as political parties’ election manifestos, election posters and spots, 
press releases, etc.). However, numerous studies have shown that voters rarely use political 
sources of information because they require an active recipient (e.g., Maurer, 2009; 
Kepplinger and Maurer, 2005; Ohr and Schrott, 2001; Popa et al., 2020). The second is 
mass media coverage. Traditional mass media report daily on political events, and citizens 
often use this political information (see e.g., Maurer, 2009; Maier, 2009; Popa et al., 2020; 
Schulz, 2011). Furthermore, recipients may receive political information “accidentally” when 
consuming mass media without actively searching for it.  
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Research questions 
In this paper, we focus on the concreteness, that is, the “quality” aspect of the information 
available on European Union (EU) politics and policies in both of the aforementioned sources 
of political information, namely party communication and mass media coverage, put forward 
by political actors. More specifically, we are interested in how concretely or vaguely political 
actors communicate their political positions on EU issues and how concretely or vaguely 
news media cover party positions on EU issues.1 
Consequently, our research questions are (following a study by Maurer, 2009): First, 
how concretely or vaguely did political parties themselves directly communicate political 
positions prior to the 2014 European Parliament elections (EPE) and how where they 
covered in the mass media? Was there a difference in the communication of concrete 
political positions between political parties and the media – or more bluntly, which informed 
citizens more concretely? Second, did differences exist between different types of parties 
regarding the communication of political positions? And finally, were there country-specific 
patterns in the communication of concrete political positions by political parties and the 
media and, if so, can we explain them? 
In the following sections, we first provide an overview of the (theoretical as well as 
empirical) state of research on vague political communication by political parties and by 
mass media and derive hypotheses. In a second step, we describe the methodological 
design of our study, explaining the case selection of the 2014 EPE and the operationalization 
of “concrete” versus “vague” political positions. We then present the results of our 
quantitative content analysis of the concreteness of political communication and mass media 
coverage in seven European countries. Finally, we discuss our results and provide 
alternative explanations and avenues for future research. 
 
State of research 
Communication of vague statements by political actors – party communication 
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To answer our first research question, if there might be expected a difference in the 
communication of concrete political positions between political parties and the mass media, 
the following section provides an overview of possible reasons, why political actors might 
lean towards the use of a vague political statements. An overview of theoretical as well as 
empirical studies is presented that might give a first hint of how often and in which situations 
vague political statements are voiced by political actors. 
In his pioneering work, An Economic Theory of Democracy, Downs (1957) argued 
that political ambiguity (or vagueness), in the sense of not voicing concrete political positions, 
is a suitable strategy for gaining votes whenever voicing a concrete political position would 
offend many voters. This hypothesis sparked a controversial discussion in the field of political 
science, and many researchers published (theoretical) papers on whether political ambiguity 
might be a useful campaign strategy. 
Prominently, the question has been discussed as part of the theory of political 
ambiguity (see e.g., Shepsle, 1972; Page, 1976). Here, “ambiguity” is defined as preventing 
political actors from being identified with policy positions (Shepsle, 1972: 555), that is, the 
avoidance of taking clear stands on an issue (Page, 1976: 742). Most authors belonging to 
this theoretical tradition conclude that ambiguity is a suitable strategy for gaining votes (e.g., 
Shepsle, 1972; Page, 1976; Alesina and Cukierman, 1990; Glazer, 1990; Chappell, 1994) – 
at least under certain circumstances. Such circumstances might be, for example, a given 
risk-affinity of voters (Shepsle, 1972), when there is no accordance of the political actor with 
the political position of the mean voter (Alesina and Cukierman, 1990) or if the political actor 
does not know the political position of the median voter (Glazer, 1990). 
Further, many empirical studies have been conducted in the context of Bavelas et 
al.’s (1990) theory of equivocation (for an overview, see e.g., Bull, 2000, 2008). They define 
“equivocation” similar to Shepsle (1972) and Page’s (1976) definition of ambiguity, as “non-
straightforward communication” of politicians that “appears ambiguous” or “obscure” 
(Bavelas et al., 1990: 28). Empirical research shows that equivocation is an often-used 
strategy by politicians (e.g., Bull and Mayer, 1993; Harris, 1991; Bull, 2000). In line with most 
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researchers on political ambiguity, Bavelas et al. (1990) have argued that non-
straightforward, ambiguous communication is a useful strategy for political actors if; first, the 
issue at hand is controversial among electorate (i.e., a concrete statement would offend a 
substantial number of voters), second, the politician is under pressure to respond to a 
complex question quickly and briefly, or third, if the politician lacks adequate knowledge of an 
issue. 
Several empirical studies have also addressed the concreteness of electoral 
promises, in particular (e.g., Dupont et al., 2016; Hakansson and Naurin, 2016; Naurin, 
2014). A side benefit of communicating vague political statements or election promises is 
that the vaguer a policy is formulated, the broader the party’s later freedom of action in its 
implementation (Naurin, 2014).  
Further, a few (quasi-)experimental studies exist on the effects of political ambiguity 
on evaluations of political actors (e.g., Rosen and Einhorn, 1972; Patton and Smith, 1980; 
Rudd, 1989; Reinemann and Maurer, 2005; Nagel, 2012). These studies have shown that a 
vague communication style leads to more positive evaluations of a political communicator 
compared with concrete political statements, at least if recipients do not have an (immediate) 
opportunity to compare these vague statements with the concrete statements of another 
political actor. 
In sum, the aforementioned studies and findings show that communicating vague 
political statements (under specific circumstances) seems to be a useful strategy for political 
actors (e.g., to increase positive evaluations or improve electoral performance) – therefore, 
they should be expected to use it frequently.2  
 
Communication of vague statements by political actors – mass media coverage 
What about the second source of political information, used even more often by the 
citizens, namely mass media coverage? Abundant research in communication science 
shows that mass media do not simply echo what political actors state or simply adopt political 
actors’ attention for issues (see Walgrave and Van Aelst, 2016) but select specific issues, 
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paraphrases/ edits them (see also Schulz, 2011) or gives more voice to specific actors (e.g., 
Hagen 1993). However, as far as the concreteness in media coverage is concerned hardly 
any research exists to our knowledge. Does it seem plausible that the media cover vague 
political statements by political actors – and if yes, as frequently as political actors do when 
they communicate directly through their party communication channels? 
In this regard, two publications by Maurer (2007, 2009) are important that impart an 
impression of the frequency vague political statements occur in mass media coverage 
(compared to political communication). Maurer (2007, 2009) conducted a quantitative content 
analysis of election manifestos and campaign speeches for the 2005 German parliament 
election, with a focus on the issues “labor” and “taxes”, and the corresponding media 
coverage. His analyses show that newspaper and TV news coverage avoid conveying vague 
statements. The more concretely statements in party manifestos were formulated, the more 
likely they were to be covered by the media. 
This finding might be explained, among other reasons, by news value theory. 
According to this theory of journalistic news selection, journalists orient their news selection 
on certain characteristics of (external) events, the so-called news factors such as facticity, 
conflict, prominence and surprise (e.g., Galtung and Ruge, 1965; Schulz, 1976; Ruhrmann et 
al., 2003). These news factors help journalists to recognize what is newsworthy and what is 
not. The original contribution of Galtung and Ruge (1965) also includes unambiguity as news 
factor arguing that simple and easily interpretable rather than complex events are preferred. 
Compliant with the news value theory, vague political statements should be less newsworthy 
than concrete positions, because vague statements do not or only to a lesser degree include 
news factors such as unambiguity, conflict, facticity, surprise, and so on (e.g., Galtung and 
Ruge, 1965; Schulz, 1976; Ruhrmann et al., 2003). 
However, simplification as a news factor could also play a role (see Östgaard, 1965). 
Due to limited time or space, the media draw on information they retrieve from political 
parties and tend to simplify it in their coverage (on time and space restrictions, see also 
White’s (1950) contribution on gatekeeping; Leidecker, 2015; Maurer, 2007). Consequently, 
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this could be a reason why mass media cover positions of political actors more vaguely. Also 
results from the personalization literature provide support for this point by showing that media 
coverage of politics often tends to focus on single persons and non-political aspects of 
politics instead of on hard political facts (e.g., Adam and Maier, 2010; Schulz, 2011). 
 
The role of the medium: Comparing party communication and media coverage 
Altogether, the studies and theoretical approaches discussed so far show that political 
actors themselves might benefit by communicating vague statements. However, drawing on 
existing research so far it is not clear how concrete mass media cover political actors and 
their positions and statements. Therefore, we formulate an open research question and ask: 
Research question 1: Do party press releases or newspaper articles on (EU) issues 
contain fewer concrete political positions? 
 
The role of actors: Differentiation by issue position and type of issue 
A second research question that follows from this first hypothesis is if it seems 
reasonable to lump all parties together (or do we expect differences between party types)? 
Rovny (2012, 2013) has studied the conditions under which political parties communicate 
vague statements. His research indicates that political parties indeed differ in their strategic 
use of vague statements, and that at least two factors are relevant, namely, a party’s position 
on a specific issue (dimension) and the type of issue (dimension). He argues that party 
competition is multidimensional and that parties prefer to compete and present more 
concrete positions regarding those issue dimensions where they have extreme positions, that 
is which matter for their ideological profile and their constituency. By contrast, parties aim to 
de-emphasize or silence on other issue dimensions (e.g., where they have no reputation, 
hold unpopular positions or which divide their constituencies), and to blur their position, if 
they cannot avoid addressing these issues.  
Focusing more specifically on radical-right political parties, Rovny (2013: 19) shows 
that these parties take clear political positions “on the authoritarian fringe of the non-
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economic dimension” but avoid concrete political positions on the economic dimension. A 
reason for their “position blurring” strategy is that radical right voters show an affinity for non-
economic, socio-cultural issues such as immigration or law and order, while they hold 
significantly more dispersed economic positions compared with voters of political mainstream 
parties. Thus, it is reasonable for radical-right parties to avoid concrete political statements 
on economic issues to not deter voters. We start drawing on Rovny’s research that parties’ 
blurring positions are related to their overall issue (dimension) position and expect: 
H1:  Parties with “extreme” positions on European integration communicate more 
often concrete political positions compared to parties with more “centered” 
positions on European integration.  
 
However, lumping together EU issues into one issue dimension might fall short. 
Moreover, Rovny’s (2013) idea of a multidimensional competition dimension can further be 
applied to EU (or European) issues. Indeed, research on the influence of cleavages on 
parties’ support for European integration provides two insights (see Steenbergen and Marks, 
2004; Marks and Wilson, 2000; Kriesi, 2007): first, at least two policy dimensions of 
European integration, namely economic integration or political integration, have to be 
distinguished, and second, most party families face a dilemma with regard to one 
component. Broadly speaking, the left tends to be divided on the merits of economic 
integration but mostly supports political integration, while the right supports economic 
integration but is more skeptical of political integration.  
Depending on the parties’ overall position towards European integration (against or in 
favor) in combination with their ideological profile (left or right), parties have a more 
pronounced position on a specific issue dimension as compared to the other. This makes an 
elaboration of our hypothesis 1 necessary, which includes a 2x2 differentiation (namely two 
positions towards European integration x two ideological profiles) – resulting in four 
differentiated hypotheses. Accordingly, we expect parties to communicate more concretely 
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about those specific EU issues where they have a clear stance and which coincides with 
their general position towards European integration, but to avoid position-taking otherwise. 
To start with extreme positions against European integration, the right strongly and 
uniformly opposes political integration, while they are more divided over economic issues 
ranging from taxes to welfare services and the size of public sector (Iversflaten, 2005; Rovny, 
2013).Thus, we expect:  
H2a:  Parties on the right with “extreme” positions against European integration 
communicate more concrete political positions when non-economic (EU) 
issues are considered compared to economic (EU) issues. 
On the other hand, the radical left strongly opposes economic integration because it 
threatens national achievements regarding the welfare state and industrial relations, though it 
is also critical of political integration. More precisely, the shift of political competence to the 
EU is perceived as undemocratic. However, these non-economic EU issues play a 
secondary role for them due to their ideological profile. We thus expect them, if they address 
these issues at all in their communication, to be more likely to blur their positons as 
compared to their core economic EU issues. 
H2b:  Parties on the left with “extreme” positions against European integration 
communicate more concrete political positions when economic (EU) issues 
are considered compared to non-economic (EU) issues. 
By contrast, to continue with extreme positions in favour of European integration, the 
left strongly supports political integration as an opportunity to enforce EU-wide regulations, 
while the right supports economic integration through the benefits of lower trade barriers and 
market liberalization. Accordingly, we hypothesise:  
H2c:  Parties on the right with “extreme” positions in favor of European integration 
communicate more concrete political positions when economic (EU) issues 
are considered compared to non-economic (EU) issues. 
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H2d:  Parties on the left with “extreme” positions in favor of European integration 
communicate more concrete political positions when non-economic (EU) 
issues are considered compared to economic (EU) issues. 
 
The role of the media system, i.e., professionalization of journalism: Differentiation by 
countries 
Finally, we not only expect differences between party types but also between 
countries. We build on Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) well-established conceptual framework 
which compares media systems of 18 Western democracies to analyze differences and 
similarities of the relations between politics and the (mass) media. Their framework (2004) 
consists of four dimensions with regards to media systems (e.g., professionalization of 
journalism or political parallelism) and of five dimensions regarding to political contexts (of 
media systems; e.g., type of democracy or degree of pluralism). Out of these dimensions, 
they developed three ideal models of media-politics relations, namely the so called 
“Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model” (including France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and 
Spain), the “North/Central Europe or Democratic Corporatist Model” (Germany, Austria, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland), and the “North 
Atlantic or Liberal Model” (United States, Canada, Great Britain, and Ireland). 
For our analysis, we rely on one dimension concerning media systems, namely the 
professionalization of journalism, to draw conclusions relating to possible country differences. 
Indicators of professional journalism are the degree of journalistic autonomy, the 
development of distinct professional rules and norms, like practical routines or ethical 
principles, and a public service orientation of journalists (Hallin and Mancini, 2004; 
Brüggemann et al., 2014). Additional, along with professionalization goes an information-
orientation of journalists and a substantial journalism education (where standards of news 
selection and processing (informative content) are trained; e.g., Kepplinger, 2011; Leidecker,  
2015). As vague (political) statements are less informative and newsworthy than concrete 
political positions, we conclude: 
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H3a: In countries where professionalization of journalism is weak, media coverage 
contains less concrete political positions than in countries, where 
professionalization of journalism is strong.  
 
The effect of professionalization on the difference between media  
Further, implying hypothesis one, according to which party communication contains 
fewer concrete political positions than mass media, we expect the difference between media 
coverage and party communication regarding the communication of concrete political 
positions to be higher in media systems with strong journalism professionalization compared 
to systems with a rather weak professionalization of journalism. This is, because highly 
professionalized journalism should rely more on informative, concrete political positions than 
weakly professionalized journalism. 
H3b: In countries where professionalization of journalism is strong, the difference 
between media coverage and party communication regarding the 
communication of concrete political positions is higher than in countries, where 
professionalization of journalism is weak.  
 
 
 
Study design 
To test our hypotheses, we chose the 2014 EPE as a case study because general knowledge 
about EU politics and policies is relatively low among citizens, making the EPE an interesting 
case. Many studies have further shown that the EU may not be regarded as one of the “core 
issues” of political parties (e.g., they spend less money and time on EPE campaigning 
compared to national elections [Giebler and Lichteblau, 2016] and the strategic communication 
mostly focuses on national or domestic rather than European issues [Marsh, 1998]).3 
Therefore, one would expect a relatively high amount of vaguely formulated statements in 
parties’ communication on European issues.  
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Further, the focus on EPE enables us to conduct a cross-country comparison of party 
and mass media communication related to one common overall issue, that is, European 
integration. We relied on cross-country quantitative content analysis of EU-related press 
releases and newspaper articles in seven European countries, namely, Germany, Austria, 
France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Portugal, and Greece. These countries vary 
regarding one of our explanatory variables, namely journalism professionalization 
(Brüggemann et al., 2014), which should explain cross-national differences in use of 
concrete political positions between different media systems as well as between party 
communication and the media. 
We have chosen an analysis period of 12 weeks to collect a substantial number of 
articles respectively press releases with a reference to European issues for different reasons. 
We go for a 12 weeks analysis period, as the EPE are still “second-order” (Reif and Schmitt, 
1980; see also Marsh, 1998; Schmitt, 2005; Niedermayer, 2014) as compared to first-order 
national elections. Moreover, news media coverage on EPE is significantly lower compared 
to national election coverage (e.g., De Vreese et al., 2007; Leidecker-Sandmann and Wilke, 
2016). Finally, more than 60 percent of European election candidates start their election 
campaign more than three months before the election (see Giebler and Lichteblau, 2016). 
For party communication, we analyzed all EU-related press releases of political 
parties having a voter turnout over three percent in the last European or national election 
before the 2014 EPE and participating in the 2014 EPE. We choose press releases as a data 
source because press releases – in contrast to manifestos, election posters, or spots – are 
specifically geared towards the media. Press releases are a simple and cheap form for 
parties to spread their issues, they are published almost every day and in great number, 
while for the media they are a convenient source of information, usually containing one or 
two pages of “pure” text and content (see also Haselmeyer et al., 2017). 
For mass media coverage, we selected (quality) newspapers, which are a distinctive 
political medium in Europe in contrast to television, which satisfies mainly entertainment 
needs. Moreover, print media tend to be more extensive and provide more in-depth 
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background information regarding political information than broadcast coverage, where the 
contributions are usually limited to a few minutes (e.g., Schulz, 2011). Finally, compared with 
broadcasting, the press is also considered a “storage medium”: messages do not “rush” past 
the recipient but are materially available. Consequently, even complex political facts can be 
comprehensibly communicated (Wilke, 1998). For our analysis, we rely on all EU-related 
newspaper articles in two national quality newspapers per country, (one left- and one right-
leaning newspaper; see appendix 1).4  
 
Coding logic 
The following coding logic is used for both information source, party communication and mass 
media coverage. 
A reference to the EU occurred if the press release or newspaper article contained at 
least two references to European policies, European institutions, European politicians, or the 
EPE. For this, we compiled an electronic search string that contained the relevant keywords. 
For the newspaper coding, all articles published in the political and commentary section were 
considered (for further details on data sources and search strings, see appendix 1). 
Coding was done at the actor level for both the press releases and newspaper articles. 
More precisely, we identified first active actors formulating a political statement or performing 
an action (such as passing a law). Thus, active actors were not merely (passively) mentioned 
in a press release or newspaper article, but agitated either saying or doing something within 
the press release or newspaper article. We only considered national political actors explicitly 
affiliated to a national party. We chose national instead of European parties as European 
elections and campaigns take part mainly in the national arena (e.g., Reif and Schmitt, 1980; 
Regierungsforschung.de, 2014).  
As mostly one single political actor or party publishes each press release, we 
gathered one main active actor per press release but up to three active actors per 
newspaper article in which usually several political actors are quoted or referred to. For each 
active political actor, we then collected first, the main issue the active actor talked about – 
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focusing on two broader issues, an economic issue (i.e., social and labor market issues) and 
a non-economic, EU-generic issue (i.e., territorial questions, constitutional questions, and the 
functioning of the EU) – and second, whether the active actor advocated a concrete political 
position or a vague political statement. 
To ensure the reliability of manual coding, 26 coders participated in a comprehensive 
training program, followed by a (researcher–coder) reliability test based on at least 25 active 
actors that showed satisfactory reliability values (Holsti: 0.72–0.92; Krippendorff’s Alpha: 
0.62–0.89; for details see Appendix 2).5 
 
Operationalization of dependent and independent variables 
Dependent variable “type of issue position”: Following Shepsle’s (1972) and Page’s (1976) 
works on “political ambiguity,” we define “vague political statements” as messages that do 
not contain any information on concrete political principles, concrete political positions, plans, 
or goals. Vague political statements shun clear stands; they “withhold information about 
policy positions” (Chappell, 1994: 281) or “avoid stances on some dimensions of 
multidimensional conflict” (Rovny, 2013: 5). Put simply, they are imprecise. By contrast, we 
define “concrete political positions” as presented when active political actors not only talk 
about an issue (in our case EU-related), but also present a policy position or plan regarding 
this issue, for example, in the form of support or rejection of a concrete measure (see also 
Reinemann and Maurer, 2005; Maurer, 2009; Nagel, 2012; Rovny, 2012). 
We would like to give some examples from our collected press releases and 
newspaper articles. The following press release of the Green Party (UK, 21 May 2014) 
includes several statement which would classify as vague statements, as they do not contain 
any information about the concrete political plans of the speaking active actor: “Green MEPs 
would make a fresh push to tackle the growing pay gap between Europe’s CEOs and their 
workforce, following elections on 22nd May.” or: “More Green MEPs means more 
opportunities to bring about an economy that works for the common good.” But vague 
political statements can also be found in newspaper articles: “It's a slogan that has to be in 
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place in any red campaign: "Tax justice" propagated the SPÖ before the European elections 
on May 25th.” (Der Standard, 6. Mai 2014, p. 7).6 These stand-alone statements do not 
contain information on how exactly the implied policies/ the “fresh push” would look like and 
what is meant by an “economy that works for the common good” or “tax justice”, respectively.  
The same press release includes the following statements with a concrete political 
positions: “A new directive on a European minimum income and EU-wide pay ratios for every 
company are the flagship measures designed to restore a degree of fairness to the corporate 
salary scale.” Or: “Limiting bonuses to a maximum of 100 percent of salary, or 200 percent if 
shareholders vote for it, will reduce unnecessary risk-taking and make bankers more 
accountable for their actions.” This is also the case in the newspaper article where the 
Austrian SPÖ calls “In addition to the fight against tax fraud and competition, […] for a 
reduction in the burden of labour at the expense of wealth –now for the entire EU.”7 
To give a last example: “UKIP is determined to make a new and better offer to 
working people” (UKIP, 17 March 2014) would have been coded as a vague statement 
because it is not clear how the “new and better offer” concretely looks like. However, this 
press releases, which has been coded to have a concrete political position, contains the 
following sentence: “To help the lowest paid we will set out ambitions plans to further raise 
the amount that can be earned before any tax is paid.” (UKIP, 17 March 2014) Here, a 
political position on taxes is given (namely to reduce tax payments). 
 
In a nutshell, we operationalized statements of active actors talking about an issue 
without voicing his or her own plans or position as vague statements. If an active actor talked 
about an issue and voiced his/her/the parties’ political position or plans, we operationalized 
this as a concrete political position. This proceeding resulted in a dichotomous variable type 
of issue position – concrete versus vague – as our dependent variable. 
Independent variables: Our analysis differentiates between parties holding extreme 
and centered positions on European integration. The “extremity” of this issue position is 
measured based on parties’ issue position towards European integration ranging from one to 
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seven, available in the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES; for details see Bakker et al., 
2015). To capture parties on the left and the right we relied on parties’ general left-right 
position as a proxy ranging from zero to ten, also available in the CHES. We further 
differentiate between the type of issue that is communicated by political actors or the media, 
namely economic versus non-economic issues. As economic issues we have covered topics 
related, for instance, to stimulus packages and safety umbrellas, free movement of goods, 
capital and services within the EU or banking union. For non-economic issues, we restricted 
our analysis on the topics related to territorial and constitutional questions as well as the 
functioning of the EU such as the division of power between political levels and EU 
membership (e.g. British referendum). Finally, professionalization of journalism is measured 
using the dimension index values by Brüggemann et al. (2014: 1061, Table 12).  
 
Results 
The following analysis is based 1368 cases consisting of 942 press releases issued by 46 
national parties (and party coalitions) and 426 active actors mentioned in 230 newspaper 
articles by 14 national quality newspapers (see appendix 2). We relied on logistic regressions 
to test our hypotheses and calculated cluster-corrected standard errors to account that the 
political statements are not independent from each other but nested within parties. 
Starting with a description of our data, both, press releases as well as media 
coverage contain more concrete political positions on EU issues than vague political 
statements. However, cross-national variations exist when comparing the amount of concrete 
respectively vague political statements in party communication and newspaper coverage 
(see figure 1). Political parties in Germany, the Netherlands and France communicate more 
concretely (in over 95 percent of their press releases) as compared to Greek parties, for 
example, where almost every third press release contains a vague political statement. 
Regarding media coverage, by contrast, concrete communication is more widespread in the 
Netherlands, Austria and the UK (all over 90 percent) as compared to Germany (60 percent) 
and Portugal (67 percent). 
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In addition, the results from the logistic regression analysis of positional statements in 
press releases and media coverage by country revealed that the relationship between party 
communication and mass media coverage was not uniform across countries (see Table 1). 
The coefficient in the overall model, including all countries together, is not significant 
indicating that party communication and newspaper coverage hardly differs in terms of 
concreteness of political statements. 
However, when turning to the analysis by each country separately, the coverage of 
concrete political positions in press releases and quality newspapers differs significantly in 
three out of seven countries, namely, France, Germany and Portugal. National parties in 
these three countries communicated more often concrete political positions (in their press 
releases) as compared to their newspaper coverage. The odds for press releases to contain 
concrete political positions in Table 1 ranged from almost four times higher in Portugal to 
more than 12 in Germany, with France in between with 7 times higher odds. For the 
remaining countries, that is Austria, Greece, and the Netherlands, the relationship was 
reverse, but not as pronounced and thus not significant. In Great Britain, the proportion of 
vague political statements in party communication and mass media coverage seems quite 
balanced as the non-significant coefficient close to one suggests.  
[Figure 1 and Table 1 about here] 
In sum, the statements of political actors in party press releases more often contained 
concrete political positions on EU issues than the statements of political actors quoted in 
media coverage (85.9% versus 75.8%). In other words – at least in some countries (e.g., 
Germany or Portugal) – mass media, in our case national quality newspapers, inform the 
public less concretely compared to political parties. This finding is even more interesting as 
our analysis focuses on “quality” newspapers only, which are supposed to provide more “in-
depth” political news coverage as compared to newspapers in general.  
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We turn to our party communication hypotheses, 1 and 2, according to which parties’ 
vague statements should depend on the extremity of their issue position towards European 
integration and in interaction with the type of issue (non-economic versus economic). The 
model including all countries does not provide empirical evidence for the hypothesis 1 that 
parties on the extreme communicated more concretely, regardless of the type of issue (see 
Table 1). However, the analysis by countries provides country-specific support for our 
assumption that a party’s EU position matters, but only in selected countries, namely Austria 
and Portugal. Nevertheless, contrary to our hypothesis, parties on the extremes are more 
likely to communicate vaguely (see Figure 2 and 3 for the visualization of the results). As can 
be seen on the left-hand side in Figure 3, for instance, the probability of a press release 
issued by a Portuguese pro-EU party (e.g., Partido Socialista with a value of about 6.4) to 
contain a concrete political position is lower compared to a press release of a moderately 
anti-EU party (e.g., Bloco de Esquerda with a value of 3.1), more precisely 0.87 versus 0.93. 
Moreover and in line with the discussion above, the inverted u-shaped curves hardly differed 
when Austrian press releases and newspaper coverage are compared. By contrast, 
Portuguese parties across the whole spectrum of EU positions communicate more concretely 
as compared to the newspaper coverage of their political statements.  
[Figure 2 and 3 about here] 
The overall model in Table 1 testing the effect of extreme EU positions together with the 
specific type of issue did not corroborate our hypotheses 2a-d. Parties on the left and right 
with extreme positions against European integration do also not communicate differently 
when specific issues are considered. 
Finally, we tested hypothesis 3a, that media coverage contains fewer concrete 
political positions in countries with weaker professionalization of journalism, such as Greece 
or Austria, as compared to countries with stronger professionalization of journalism, such as 
Germany and the Netherlands. The probability of a media coverage to contain concrete 
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political positions did not change with the strength of professionalization of journalism, as the 
flat line in Figure 4 shows. However, journalistic professionalization is positively related to the 
concreteness of party communication. Parties tend to communicate more concretely in 
countries with higher journalistic professionalization. As a result thereof, the findings support 
our hypothesis 3b that the difference between the media coverage and party communication 
should be more pronounced in countries with strong professional journalism. This is, 
however, not as we would have expected due to differences regarding the concreteness in 
newspaper coverage but in party communication. As Figure 4 further shows, the effect is 
only significant for middle levels of journalistic professionalization such as the UK, France, 
and Portugal.  
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
Discussion 
This paper started from the observation that voters know relatively little about the positions of 
parties, especially concerning EU politics. We then asked whether the sources of information 
that politically interested citizens use to inform themselves explain part of this puzzle, that is, 
whether mainly parties or the mass media contribute to the dissemination of vague political 
statements. 
Starting with research question 1, our analysis shows that countries vary with regard 
to the extent to which political statements communicated by parties or mentioned in the 
media contain concrete political positions. In Germany, France and the Netherlands parties 
communicated very often concrete political positions compared to parties in Greece, for 
example. While the media in the Netherlands, Austria and UK cited more often concrete 
political positions of political actors compared to France, Germany, Portugal and Greece. 
Comparing party communication (via press releases) and media coverage, overall party 
communication and media coverage did not differ significantly in terms of concrete political 
positions. In three countries, namely Austria, Greece and the Netherlands, the newspaper 
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coverage provided the public with more concrete political information than political actors did 
via their press releases, at least based on the descriptive statistics, but the differences were 
not significant. Unexpectedly, overall, the newspaper coverage provided the public with less 
concrete political information than political actors did via their press releases.  
This finding was surprising in several respects. On the one hand, the theory of 
political ambiguity, the theory of equivocation, and earlier empirical findings (e.g., Maurer, 
2007, 2009) have suggested that political parties might benefit from communicating vague 
political statements, and therefore, do so more often. On the other hand, as the EU may not 
be regarded as one of the “core issues” of political parties, we would have expected a higher 
amount of vaguely formulated statements in their communication. Moreover, we have only 
analyzed the coverage of quality newspapers – one would expect that their coverage 
provides “in-depth” political information. An interesting question for future studies might be, if 
the amount of vague statements in political news coverage would be even lower, if not only 
quality media are considered but rather tabloid or regional newspapers. Maurer’s analyses 
(2007) would support this assumption: he shows that the tabloid newspaper BILD in 
Germany covers more vague statements than quality newspapers.  
Two possible explanations for our findings might be the news factor simplification 
(Östgaard, 1965), according to which mass media tend to simplify complex information, 
and/or the personalization hypothesis, according to which media focus more on non-political 
aspects compared to hard political facts (e.g., Adam and Maier, 2010; Schulz, 2011). 
Concomitantly, one limitation of this study is that our analysis cannot conclusively rule 
out alternative explanations of differences in ambiguity of political statements in party 
communication and media coverage. Examples for those are the purpose (e.g., press 
releases are geared towards the media, while news articles target readers) or the structure of 
the text (e.g., length and style). Also the “quality” of the medium might play a role (in our 
case, we solely analyzed quality newspapers). Future research could put more emphasis in 
and control for those factors, for instance by extending the data sources to include tabloid 
newspapers and social media channels. In addition, our study cannot verify, if the newspaper 
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coverage consists of less concrete political statements because the media focus on the 
vaguer statements of political actors (i.e., they select existing vague statements) or because 
they do turn concrete statements into vague ones (i.e., by leaving out precise details). To 
answer this question, an input-output-analysis would have been necessary respectively a 
detection of newspaper content that overlaps with content of press releases (see also Meyer 
et al., 2017). However, referring to the studies of Maurer (2007, 2009) we would lean towards 
the latter explanation. Maurer showed that media coverage avoided covering vague 
statements. The more concretely political statements in party manifestos were formulated, 
the more likely they were to be covered by the media. 
When turning to differences in party types, we cannot find empirical support that 
parties with extreme positions towards European integration communicate differently 
compared to those with “centered” positions. The exceptions are Austria and Portugal, 
where, contrary to hypothesis 1, parties without extreme EU positions communicated more 
concretely than parties with extreme EU positions. Furthermore, the results do not 
corroborate our hypothesis 2 that the communication of concrete political positions further 
depends on the type of issue as well as a party’s ideological legacy. 
Finally, contrary to hypothesis 3a, we see no significant difference in the newspaper 
coverage of concrete political positions in countries, where professionalization of journalism 
is strong compared to countries, where professionalization of journalism is weak. However, 
we found that the difference between party communication and media coverage in publishing 
vague political statements was not uniform across countries. Further research is needed to 
explain why we observe those differences among countries. Maybe the type of issue in 
combination with issue salience and/or the degree of controversial public discussion could 
serve as an explanatory factor (at the country level). As Bavelas et al. (1990) have argued, 
the use of vague political statements seems especially useful for political actors, if the issue 
at hand is controversially discussed among the electorate. 
More research is also needed on the conditions under which the communication of 
concrete positions in party communication and media coverage differ. This paper began 
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looking at the degrees of journalistic professionalization in different countries. We found that 
in countries with middle levels of journalistic professionalization, political parties 
communicate more concretely (while the degree of journalistic professionalization does not 
seem to affect newspaper coverage). This finding might imply that one should not only 
distinguish between different degrees of professionalization in journalism but also in public 
relations. Maybe also the extent of intereffication (the interconnectedness of public relations 
and journalism; e.g. Bentele et al., 1997) respectively the degree of determination (e.g., 
Baerns, 1991) might play a role in explaining differences in the communication of parties and 
the media. Moreover, future research could go beyond dimensions and aspects of the media 
system and focus on the political system. Schuck et al. (2011), for example, show that a 
country’ extent of party contestation on Europe affects the visibility of EU news in a 
curvilinear way that is higher EU media coverage when parties hardly or highly vary in EU 
positions. It is conceivable that a party’s EU blurring strategies depends not only on its own 
EU position and the type of issue, as hypothesized here, but also on those of other parties in 
the political system.       
Furthermore, it remains unanswered whether the findings could be applied to other 
non-economic (e.g., socio-cultural) and national (instead of European) issues, as our paper 
focused only on specific issues in the EPE context. This raises another question, namely, if 
the findings of our study may be generalized to other EPE (we only analyzed the party 
communication and newspaper coverage in the run-up to the 2014 EPE, that does not seem 
unique to us as regards to our research question) or to elections held at the national level. 
Further, an analysis that compares the concreteness respectively vagueness of 
political statements in time of elections with non-election times seems interesting, for 
example: are political parties in times of elections communicating more vaguely (to appeal to 
a majority of voters) than in non-election times (where they have little to fear)? Due to lack of 
a sufficient number of cases, we were not able to do separate or comparing analyses 
between different periods of time or weeks prior to the EPE in this study. 
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Although – or precisely because – most of our thoroughly derived hypotheses cannot 
be confirmed, our study provides interesting findings in an empirically underexplored 
research field. We think two very interesting findings are the following ones: 
First, “extreme” political parties or actors at the left and the right of the political 
spectrum do not communicate more concrete political positions compared to “centered” 
political parties. At least in some countries, the centrist parties/politicians are the ones who 
inform the public more concretely about their positions and plans regarding EU issues.  
Second, it is the political parties that overall communicate slightly more concretely on 
EU issues than the media do. More bluntly, we can say that in some countries political 
parties via their press releases (prior to the 2014 EPE) informed citizens remarkably more 
concretely about political positions and plans than the mass media did. This seems critical to 
us in so far as firstly mass media coverage – as against to party communication – is the main 
source of political information for most of the citizens, and secondly as our analysis only took 
quality newspaper coverage into account. The so called information function (in the sense of 
establishing a public sphere) is regarded as a central task of the mass media. In addition, of 
this information function qualitative demands are made – this means, among others, that the 
information should be covered in an understandable manner (and not roughly simplified; e.g., 
Pürer, 2008). If we take this information function of the mass media seriously, our results at 
least cast doubt on whether the newspaper coverage on European issues (fully) meets the 
requirements. Nevertheless, our results further indicate that the coverage of vaguely 
formulated political statements depends on the country concerned.
1 It is not the aim of our study to analyze any potential interference of party communication on media 
coverage (or vice versa). We simply collect party communication data and media coverage data 
separately in the same period and compare whether the content of these two data sources is different 
(in the sense of: more or less concretely/vaguely). 
2 Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that communicating vaguely is just one strategy, which parties 
can use to broaden their constituency. Other broad-appeal strategies are, for instance, taking clear 
positions but on different issues across ideological borders (e.g., welfare chauvinism), selecting two 
leaders with different ideological appeals, or combining extreme manifestos with centrist party leaders 
(see Somer-Topcu, 2015). Indeed, it could be that depending on the party type a party might choose a 
different strategy than vague communication. This goes, however, beyond the scope of this study and 
could be addressed by future research. We thank the anonymous reviewer for his suggestion.   
3 Although recent works find traces of EU politicization during the latest EPE (e.g., Hobolt and De 
Vries, 2015). 
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4 The selection of newspapers follows the media study of the European Election Studies (EES) 
project, which has been collecting data and conducting quantitative content analysis since the 1999, in 
order to make the data comparable whenever possible. However, we cross-checked them with our 
country specialists who suggested to rely on the right-leaning “Diario de Noticias” instead of “Journal 
de Noticias” for Portugal and “Efimerida” instead of “Eleftherotypia” and for Greece. 
5 We used researcher-coder rather than intercoder reliability tests, taking the average of 26 coders’ 
reliability tests, to ensure that the coders were coding the project’s research interest correct in 
substance. Their coding had to be consistent with the coding of the leading researcher and not only 
with the (possibly wrong) coding of other coders. This approach not only allowed us to give the “go-
ahead” for coders that passed the reliability test, while further instructing single coders that had not yet 
passed the reliability test (so we did not have to wait until all 26 coders passed the reliability test to 
start with our analyses). Further, this proceeding allowed us to recruit coders afterwards to do 
additional coding and replace dropping outs. 
6 “Es ist ein Slogan, der in keiner roten Kampagne fehlen darf: ‘Steuergerechtigkeit’ propagiert die 
SPÖ vor der Europawahl am 25. Mai.” (Der Standard, 6 May 2014, p. 7).  
7 “Neben Kampf gegen Steuerbetrug und -wettbewerb fordert sie eine Entlastung von Arbeit auf 
Kosten der Vermögen - nun eben für die ganze EU.” (Der Standard, 6 May 2014, p. 7). 
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Table 1. Logistic regression 
 
RQ1 H1  
All AT FR DE GR NL PT UK All AT FR DE GR 
Source (party = 
1) 
1.940 0.481 7.451** 12.67*** 0.660 
C
om
pl
et
e 
se
pa
ra
tio
n1
 
3.908*** 0.957 1.932** 0.444 6.764+ 10.76*** 0.708 
(0.88) (0.36) (4.83) (8.70) (0.26) (1.17) (0.67) (0.45) (0.23) (7.06) (7.05) (0.18) 
EU position  
       
0.994 8.857*** 0.847 0.221 0.942        
(0.45) (3.22) (0.67) (0.45) (0.41) 
EU position2        1.000 0.770*** 1.016 1.142 1.018 
       (0.06) (0.03) (0.09) (0.26) (0.05) 
Type of issue 
(non-econ. =1) 
       
            
     
EU position X 
type of issue 
       
            
     
EU position X 
EU position2 X 
type of issue 
            
            
Left-right 
position 
            
            
Professiona-
lization 
       
            
     
Professiona-
lization X 
source 
       
            
     
Constant 3.136*** 13.00*** 4.250*** 1.500 3.300*** 2.047*** 10.33*** 3.220 0.498 6.159 94.63 2.850  
(0.86) (9.54) (1.18) (0.68) (1.19) (0.31) (6.25) (2.36) (0.30) (8.51) (373.31) (2.18)         
     
N 1368 289 182 100 240 348 132 1368 289 182 100 240 
Model Chi2 2.16 1.13 13.18*** 14.70*** 1.18 24.07*** 0.00 10.11** 36.55*** 49.67*** 23.14*** 2.33 
McFadden's R2 0.016 0.005 0.108 0.200 0.004 0.064 0.000 0.016 0.026 0.109 0.224 0.008 
Notes: Exponentiated coefficients and cluster-corrected standard errors by parties in parenthesis. *** p 
< 0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
1 Cannot be calculated because there are only concrete political statements in the newspaper 
coverage (see Figure 1). 
  
COMMUNICATION OF POLITICAL POSITIONS 
32 
 
Appendix 1. Data sources, search string and parties included in the analysis 
Newspaper sample: 
AT: Der Standard (L); Die Presse (R);  
FR: Le Monde (L), Le Figaro (R),  
DE: Süddeutsche Zeitung (L), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (R),  
GR: Efimerida ton Syntakton (L), I Kathimerini (R);  
NL: de Volkskrant (L), NRC Handelsblad (R);  
PT: Público (L), Diario de Noticias (R);  
UK: Guardian (L), Daily Telegraph (R) 
L = left-leaning; R = right-leaning 
 
Search string: 
The search string contains the following key words / word components in the respective 
languages: “Europ*, europ*, EU, EP, EZB, EIB, ESM, EFSF, EFSM, EuGH, EAD, EWSA, 
EIF, EDSB, EWU, Troika, Frontex, FRONTEX, constitutional treaty” 
 
Parties included into the analysis: 
Austria:  Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ), Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (BZÖ), 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ), Das Neue Österreich und 
Liberales Forum (NEOS), Die Grünen, Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP);  
France:  Front National (FN), Front de Gauche and Parti Communiste (FG), Union pour 
un Mouvement Populaire (UMP), Parti Socialiste (PS), Europe Ecologie - Les 
Verts (Verts), Mouvement Démocrate (MoDem);  
Germany: Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), Die Linke, Christlich Demokratische Union 
Deutschlands (CDU-CSU), Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP), Bündnis 90/Die 
Grünen (Grünen), Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD);  
Greece:  Golden Dawn (XA), Communist Party of Greece (KKE), Independent Greeks 
(ANEL), Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS), Syriza, Oikologoi Prasinoi (OP), 
Democratic Left (DIMAR), Nea Dimokratia (ND), Panhellenic Socialist 
Movement (PASOK);  
Netherlands:  Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV), Socialistiese Partij (SP), ChristenUnie - 
Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (CU/SPG), Partij voor de Dieren (PvdD), 
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD), Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA), 
Christen Democratisch Appèl (CDA), GroenLinks, Democraten 66 (D66);  
Portugal:  Coligação Democrática Unitária (CDU-PCP), Bloco de Esquerda (BE), Partido 
Socialista (PS), Aliança Portugal (AP) including Partido Popular and Partido 
Social Democrata.  
UK:  UK Independence Party (UKIP), British National Party (BNP), Conservatives 
(Cons), The Green Party (Greens), Labour (Lab), Liberal Democrats 
(LibDem). 
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Appendix 2. Reliability scores  
  Press releases  News articles 
   Holsti’s R  Kalpha  Holsti’s R  Kalpha 
Main actor / active actor 1  0.92  0.89  0.76  0.75 
Active actor 2  0.85  0.81 
Active actor 3  0.72  0.62 
Main issue (agg.)  0.87  0.82  0.84  0.81 
Issue position  0.79  0.76  0.81  0.80 
Number of coders  5  21 
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Appendix 3.  
 News story (active actors) Press releases Total 
  Eco Non-eco Total Eco Non-eco Total Eco Non-eco Total 
Austria 22 6 28 215 46 261 237 52 289 
France 47 37 84 78 20 98 125 57 182 
Germany 9 11 20 69 11 80 78 22 100 
Greece 37 6 43 175 22 197 212 28 240 
Netherlands 7 15 22 42 13 55 49 28 77 
Portugal 172 23 195 150 3 153 322 26 348 
UK 5 29 34 32 66 98 37 95 132 
Total 299 127 426 761 181 942 1’060 308 1’368 
 
 
 
